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8.1  Introduction and Overview 
Legislation which allowed U.  S. firms to create Domestic International 
Sales Corporations (DISCS)  was enacted in 1971. Under its provisions the 
tax due on a portion of the export income attributable to a DISC could be 
deferred,  and therefore  the program  represented  a tax  incentive  to 
export. The way in which the tax incentive was tied to a reduction in the 
firm’s corporate income tax liability also created an incentive to substitute 
capital for other factors of production. In 1976 and 1982 the tax benefits 
from DISC were scaled back by  the U.S. Congress. Additionally, the 
program was criticized by the Europeans as a violation of  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Nevertheless, DISC was still 
in place  in  1982, its benefits were claimed on 70 percent  of  all U.S. 
exports, and a tax saving of  roughly $1.5 billion was realized. 
Export promotion policies often generate the greatest amount of pub- 
lic attention when the economy is in a business contraction or when the 
trade deficit is large. In this analysis, these conditions, which imply that 
disequilibria in labor markets or foreign exchange markets exist, are 
ignored. Instead, a longer-run general equilibrium approach is taken. In 
this framework, DISC still might result in a welfare improvement, even 
though the impact of  the subsidy is to worsen the U.S. terms of  trade. 
Such an improvement might occur because of second-best factors, such as 
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the distorting effect of  the current  corporate income  tax  or the tax 
deferral provisions available with respect to income earned abroad by 
U.S. controlled foreign corporations. In fact, DISC was promoted on the 
basis that it would give U.S.  firms a greater incentive to produce and 
export from the United States instead of  serving foreign markets by 
locating abroad. A major focus of this paper is to determine the extent to 
which investment and production at home versus abroad is affected by 
incentives such as DISC. 
In the static, general equilibrium model developed here, two countries 
are represented, the U.S. and the rest of the world. The model in part is 
made up of  familiar elements, including: 
(a) Commodity  demand  functions  in  each  country describing the 
choice  between  imported  goods,  domestically  produced  competing 
goods, home nontraded goods, and exportables. 
(b) Factor demand equations in each country in which the demand for 
each factor depends on the quantity of  each good produced and on 
relative factor prices. 
(c)  Competitive price equations in which the price of  each good is 
equated to total factor cost. 
DISC enters into this framework in several ways. First, it reduces the 
relative price charged for U.S. exports because it lowers the tax compo- 
nent of export costs. In addition, DISC lowers the cost of capital in export 
production relative to the cost of  other inputs because it lowers the tax 
only on the return to capital. This tends to increase the demand for capital 
in the United States. Finally DISC changes the level of  real income, 
which affects U.S. product demands, because the export incentive has to 
be financed by either an increase in other taxes or lower government 
expenditures. In other words, the benefit to foreigners in terms of more 
favorable prices  requires  a  reduction in expenditures by  the United 
States. 
This income effect alternatively can be related to the terms of  trade 
change experienced by the United States. If foreigners are able to obtain 
U.S.  goods more cheaply because less U.S. tax is collected on export 
earnings, the U.S. terms of  trade worsen and real income falls. When 
greater U.S. export output drives up the relative price of  exports, this 
partially offsets the direct tax cost of DISC. Equivalently, the terms of 
trade loss is reduced. 
The model developed here has a few other special features. Production 
of all goods is assumed to require three factors of production-unskilled 
labor, skilled labor, and capital-in  order that aspects of the controversy 
over the factor content of trade (see, for example, Baldwin 1971; Bran- 
son  and Monoyios  1977) be  included  in the analysis. This  situation 
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earlier general equilibrium models by  Goulder ,  Shoven, and Whalley 
(1981) and  by  Horst (1981) used  to analyze international tax policy 
changes.  Also, in the Horst model only a single good was produced 
abroad, while the Goulder model did not include foreign production, but 
rather foreign endowments of output. The present model, in which each 
country produces three goods, allows a more complete representation of 
the possibilities to reallocate resources across industries in the rest of the 
world. Such a distinction particularly might be expected to influence the 
allocation  of  capital internationally (Jones  1967; Gerking and Mutti 
1981). 
The  effects of DISC on international capital allocation are important in 
this study for two reasons. First, the potential reduction in U.S. income 
resulting from the terms of  trade loss may be offset if  DISC results in 
more capital being used in the United States, where it will be subject to 
U.S. rather than foreign taxation. Second, the reallocation of capital may 
significantly affect the distributional impacts of DISC. The allocation of 
capital internationally is assumed to depend on relative after-tax rates of 
return in the United States and the rest of the world. DISC provides an 
incentive to use more capital in U.S. export production, but U.S. pro- 
duced  capital goods also  become  cheaper abroad. To include  these 
various and potentially offsetting effects, two alternative treatments of 
international capital mobility are formulated. A key question addressed 
is the extent to which after-tax returns across countries or across sectors 
are equalized. In one formulation of  the model, after-tax returns are 
equalized across sectors within a country, and varying degrees of capital 
mobility are assumed internationally. This framework, which assumes a 
very high degree of integration of capital markets domestically, is similar 
to the work of  Goulder et al. and of  Horst. An alternative formulation 
treats the closest substitute for investment in a particular industry not as 
investment in another sector of  the home market, but rather as invest- 
ment in the same industry abroad. This treatment reflects the perspective 
of past writings on the operations of multinational corporations by Caves 
(1971) and Batra and Ramachandran  (1980), based on the view that 
multinational corporations may earn higher than normal returns to spe- 
cific expertise applicable in their industry alone. 
As in previous work, the model is complex enough that analytical 
solutions do not  yield  unambiguous  signs, and determination  of  the 
direction and magnitude of changes in output, prices, and factor rewards 
must be based on a particular set of parameter values. Empirical projec- 
tions from these two frameworks are made on the basis of data from the 
operation of DISCS  in 1979.  These data provide a useful indication of the 
relative effects of  DISC on outputs and factor rewards, although the 
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of the  1981 Economic Recovery  Tax Act  (ERTA) result  in sharply 
reduced corporate tax burdens and a correspondingly smaller differential 
incentive to export as a result of  DISC. 
With respect to the two models developed, the simulated results are 
somewhat  similar when a high degree of  capital mobility is assumed 
internationally, but as capital becomes less mobile, substantial differ- 
ences between them arise. Of  particular interest from a policy perspec- 
tive, the percentage change in the volume of merchandise exports (about 
3 percent if all exports were covered by DISC) is roughly 65 percent of the 
estimate that would be obtained using the same trade elasticities in a 
partial equilibrium framework. Unskilled labor clearly loses from DISC, 
while skilled labor benefits if  capital can easily be reallocated interna- 
tionally. From the standpoint of  economic efficiency, DISC results in a 
deterioration of the U.S. terms of trade. The stock of capital used in the 
United States increases slightly, but the gains from this reallocation are 
not great enough to offset the terms of  trade loss. U.S. welfare falls by 
roughly half of  the tax cost of  DISC. 
The organization of  this paper first is to explain the incentives created 
by DISC for a single firm. Then the general equilibrium model of  the 
United States and the rest of  the world is presented. The major purpose 
of this model is to show how DISC affects the allocation of  resources both 
nationally and internationally. Values of the appropriate behavioral de- 
mand and production parameters  are discussed next, followed by  the 
projected changes in outputs and factor rewards attributable to DISC. 
Consequent welfare effects of  DISC on the United States are analyzed, 
and a concluding section notes other relevant issues for any policy assess- 
ment of DISC. 
8.2  The Analysis of DISC at the Micro Level 
8.2.1  Background and History 
Domestic International Sales Corporations, through which exporters 
can defer (indefinitely) the tax on part of the corporate income earned on 
exports, were first authorized by the Revenue Act of 1971. There are two 
basic steps in calculating the portion of  export profits that can be tax 
deferred. The first determines the amount of  overall export profits that 
can be allocated to the DISC, and the second, the percentage of  the 
DISC’S income whose taxation can be deferred. 
In the first step, a DISC can have profits which do not exceed the 
greater of 
(1)  4  percent of the gross value of qualified export sales plus 10  percent 
of  related export promotion expenses; 
(2)  50 percent of the combined taxable income from exports of  the 
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(3) income based  on the price  actually charged  the DISC by  the 
supplier if  it can be justified under the normal “arm’s-length” 
rules. 
The first two options are departures from normal arm’s-length transfer 
pricing rules and are an important source of DISC benefits. The third 
pricing or allocation option would ordinarily only be chosen by indepen- 
dent DISCs who export goods purchased from third parties. A corpora- 
tion producing export goods would choose option (2), the 50 percent 
rule, if  its profit margin were in excess of  8 percent of sales, because it 
could then defer more income than under the 4 percent rule. If, on the 
other hand, margins are less than 8 percent of sales, it would choose the 4 
percent rule. In fact, DISC exports are split about equally between those 
using the 4  percent of gross sales rule and those using the 50 percent of 
combined  taxable income rule.  However, the 50-50 rule accounts for 
about 80 percent of the total corporate profits deferred through DISCs. 
In terms of the capital used in exports, therefore, the 50-50 rule is by far 
the most significant. 
Turning now to the portion of  DISC income that can be deferred, a 
DISC is itself tax-exempt, but its shareholders are taxed on actual or 
imputed dividends from the DISC. In the original legislation in 1971, a 
DISC was assumed to distribute 50 percent of  its income, whether it 
actually distributed this large a share of income to the parent or not. This 
meant that an exporter using the 50-50 rule could defer 25 percent of the 
overall combined taxable profits from exports. The Tax Reform Act of 
1976 limited  the 50 percent  deferral  to DISC profits attributable  to 
exports in excess of  67 percent of  average exports in a four-year base 
period, the last year of which is four years prior to the current tax year. As 
a result of the incremental rule, the average deferral rate in 1979 was 32.3 
percent instead of the earlier 50 percent. In view of the amount of income 
allocated to the DISC, 18.3  percent of the combined export profits of the 
DISC and its parent was deferred. DISC therefore represents an 18.3 
percent reduction in the corporate tax on export income. This will be 
regarded simply as a reduction in the tax rate on capital income, even 
though for the small share of benefits derived by users of the 4 percent of 
sales rule, DISC is more of  an ad valorem subsidy on exports unrelated to 
factor usage.  The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of  1982 
further reduced DISC benefits by reducing the deferral permitted under 
previous law by 15  percent, that is, the 50 percent deferral rate now is 42.5 
percent. 
8.2.2  Economic Incentives Created by DISC 
DISC changes the relative cost of exports by lowering the cost of equity 
capital used in export production relative to the cost of capital elsewhere 
in the economy. The cost of capital services to a firm reflects the price of 
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given to investors for them to supply their capital, and any tax liability 
that results from the capital return. For a given after-tax return at the 
corporate level, capital must produce a gross return sufficient  both to pay 
investors this after-tax return and to pay the required taxes to the  govern- 
ment. 
Consider the simple case in which there is only equity capital, that is, 
no debt, and real capital does not depreciate. (See appendix A for further 
elaboration.) Assume the price of  capital goods used in production is c. 
Then, for a given required after-tax return of  i percent per year, and a tax 
on the equity return to  capital oft,  the annual marginal product of capital, 
m, must be such that m (1 -  t)  = ci. In other words, the annual rental cost 
of capital input is ci/(l -  t) (Hall and Jorgenson 1967). If  the capital tax 
rate on exports falls from t to tI, then for the given after-tax return, the 
marginal cost of  capital declines to (1 -  t)/(l -  tl) of its former level. 
With perfect competition in exports, which is  assumed in the paper, 
export prices fall by the amount of  the decline in the marginal cost of 
output. DISC therefore reduces the price of  exports relative to other 
goods in the same way that a lower payroll tax in a particular activity 
would lower the activity’s price relative to other goods. Workers would 
be willing to work  for a lower gross wage, which is the cost to the 
employer, because they can get the same after-tax income as in other 
activities. 
DISC also affects factor input usage, because it reduces the extent to 
which equity capital is discouraged relative to other inputs. Again, taking 
the case where all capital is financed by  equity, and therefore not  a 
deductible cost of doing business, the ratio of the marginal productivities 
of capital and labor is ci/[(l -  t)w],  where w  is the wage rate, equal to the 
marginal productivity of  labor. When DISC reduces the corporate tax 
rate faced, there is an incentive to substitute capital for labor. 
8.2.3 
Looking at the way DISC interacts with other tax incentives, such as 
the investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation, may help illus- 
trate the way DISC works. The interaction with investment tax credits 
and depreciation allowances differs. An increased investment tax credit, 
such as the present 10 percent credit for most equipment, has a limited 
effect on the relative incentive effect of DISC, that is, the cost of exports 
relative to other goods. An exporter can still continue to enjoy the same 
DISC  benefits and in addition use the additional investment tax credit for 
any remaining tax liability. On the other hand, increased depreciation 
allowances, as in ERTA, do erode the DISC benefit. As indicated above, 
most capital in exports uses the 50-50 pricing rule for DISC income. The 
amount of tax deferral that can be provided by a DISC therefore depends 
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on the amount of  overall taxable income on the export sale. Increased 
depreciation allowances reduce taxable income, which means that the tax 
saving per dollar of  export sales is reduced. In the extreme case where 
depreciation allowances eliminate taxable income, DISC provides no 
benefit. 
Increased depreciation allowances may also erode the DISC benefits to 
those using the 4 percent of  gross sales rule, because the allocation of 
income to the DISC cannot result  in  a loss to the parent. Increased 
depreciation allowances, as in the Accelerated Cost Recovery System in 
1981, will reduce the DISC benefit if  they reduce overall taxable profit 
margins below 4 percent. 
The interaction between DISC and other tax incentives is clear from 
the standard Hall-Jorgenson cost of  capital formula, 
where t is the corporate tax rate, k is the rate of the investment tax credit, i 
is the required real percentage after-tax return, 6 is the annual rate of 
economic depreciation, and 2 is the present value of  depreciation al- 
lowances (evaluated using the nominal return).  DISC is effectively a 
reduction in the tax rate t. The formula demonstrates that the effect on 
the cost of capital of a reduction in the tax rate is diluted by an increase in 
2,  the value of  depreciation deductions. 
The  significance of  the effect of the Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
(ACRS) in ERTA on the incentive effect of DISC can be seen from the 
changes in the revenue cost of  DISC resulting from the enactment of 
ACRS. The U.S. Treasury Department (1981) estimates that by 1984 the 
revenue costs of  DISC will be 18 percent lower because of  ACRS. 
8.3  DISC in a General Equilibrium Model 
An overview of the general equilibrium approach taken in this study 
was given in the introduction. Here two different models are developed 
to be used in evaluating DISC. 
8.3.1 
In this model, two countries are assumed. Each country produces three 
goods. Also, each country has fixed supplies of  unskilled and skilled 
labor, which are immobile internationally but which can be shifted cost- 
lessly across industries within a country. Total capital available in the 
world is fixed. Within a country capital is perfectly mobile among indus- 
tries, but  internationally capital mobility is  not  sufficient to equalize 
after-tax returns. This result with respect to international capital flows is 
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somewhat similar to the framework proposed by Kemp and Wan (1974), 
where international adjustment costs are assumed to exist but the adjust- 
ment process also is not modeled explicitly. 
In each country perfectly competitive output and factor markets are 
assumed. Given strictly quasi-concave, linear, homogeneous production 
functions, full employment of  all factors of  production is ensured. In 
country A this condition is represented as 
(1)  C2i Xi, + C22 xu  + c2N  xNA  =  LA 9 
(2) 
(3) 
c&  xu  + c$ xu  + c& XNA = SA, 
c&  x1A + c&  x2A + c&  XNA = KA, 
where C$  is the amount of input i necessary to produce one unit of output 
j in country k, XiA  represents output of the ith good in country A,  and the 
factor supplies of unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital are denoted 
by LA, SA, and KA, respectively. As shown in appendix B, DISC incen- 
tives affect the determination of  input-output coefficients in industries 
one and two, and any change in DISC alters optimal factor proportions. 
The three aggregate production sectors of  the economy represent a 
composite of  industries for which the country is a net importer, XlA, a 
composite of industries for which the country is a net exporter, Xu, and a 
nontraded sector, XNA.  This characterization of three separate industries 
is somewhat similar to the trade literature testing the factor content of 
trade,  where regression  models  are estimated to predict whether  an 
industry is a net exporter or a net importer based on certain industry 
characteristics. In both that situation and in the present model, factor 
input requirements are assumed to differ across industries. 
However, the definition of  a net import or net export industry may 
suggest another condition not imposed on this analysis. Domestic output 
in an industry is not assumed to be perfectly substitutable with output 
from the same industry in the other country. Thus, three similar full- 




cf1  x1B  + cf2  x2B  + CfN XNB =  LB  9 
c!1  x1B  + c!2  x2B + c!N  XNB =  SB  > 
c&  XI, f c&  x2B  + c&V  XNB = KB  3 
but X, and XjB  are not identical products. Additionally, the assumption  - 
that the available supply of capital in the world is fixed, KA + KB = K, 
allows equation (6)  to be rewritten in terms of  KA. 
Perfectly competitive output markets, together with the earlier pro- 
duction  assumptions,  guarantee  that  producers  earn  zero profits  in 
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(7)  cfl WA + c@l  qA  + c&  rAl(1 -  tlA) =  PlA  > 
(8) 
(9) 
cfz  WA + c,$z  qA  + c&  rA/(1 -  tu)  = P’, 




cfl  wB  + c,”,  qB + cil rB/(l -  tlB) =  PIB  7 
c,”,  WB + c,”,  qB  + ci2 rB/(l -  tZB) = P2B  7 
c!N  WB + CfN qB + ci?N  rB /( 1 -  tNB)  = pNB  7 
where wi is the wage paid to unskilled labor in country  i, qi is the wage paid 
to skilled labor in country i, ri is the after-tax return to capital paid in 
country i, and tij is an ad valorem tax levied on capital income in industry i 
of country j.  Also, ej  is the price of Xii received by the producer. Again, 
because goods produced in the same industry but in different countries 
are not assumed to be identical, five relative price terms must be in- 
cluded, with the price of the nontraded good in A being the numeraire. 
Since capital is perfectly mobile within a country, the same after-tax 
return to capital is earned in all industries, but clearly the before-tax 
returns will differ when tax rates across industries differ. 
Consumers in each country choose among five different goods, X]A, 
Xu, XIB,  X2B,  and the relevant nontraded good, XNA or XNB.  That is, 
country A exports some of  its net import goods and country B exports 
some of  its net  import  goods.  Quantities demanded will  depend on 
income and the relative prices of  these goods, inclusive of  any tariffs. 
Because this formulation is quite standard, the relevant equations are 
presented in appendix B, which shows the way DISC affects import prices 
seen by foreigners. One  aspect which does deserve special attention is the 
relevant income expression, which depends on four types of  terms: (1) 
the value of production within a country; (2) net earnings from foreign 
investment after payment of foreign taxes; (3) tariff revenues; and (4) the 
value of  subsidies paid to foreigners through DISC export promotion. 
(13)  YA = PIAXIA  + PuX2,4  + XNA  + ~B(KA  -  KA) 
f TARlA PlBA  + TARZA p2BA  xZBA 
-  DISCP ‘ P]AX]AB -  DISCP . PZAXMB. 
(14)  YB = PIBXIB  + p2Bx2B + PNBXNB + rB(KB -  KB) 
+ TAR~BPIABXIAB  + TARZBP~ABXZAB. 
Y;. is the value of nominal income in country i.  Ki indicates country i’s 
ownership of capital, while Ki  is the amount of worldwide capital used in 
country i. The amount of capital used in a country can change in response 
to economic incentives. When capital is reallocated from country A to 288  John MuttiIHarry Grubert 
country B, then KA declines and KB increases. The United States is a net 
creditor to the rest of the world, so that (KA -  KA)  >  0, while the rest of 
the world is a net debtor, where (KB -  KB)  = -  (KA -  KA)  <  0. TAR, 
represents ad valorem tariff rates levied in countryj  on imports of i goods, 
Eik  are the prices charged to consumers in country k for good i produced 
in countryj, and the Xiik  are interpreted similarly in the case of sales. The 
DISCP terms represent the cost to the United States of  the tax benefit 
offered to exporters. It is the difference between the tax exporters would 
have paid without DISC and their tax payments inclusive of DISC bene- 
fits. The additional tax that exporters would pay without DISC reflects 
both the higher tax rate and the higher pretax income that would have to 
be earned to end up with the same after-tax income. 
To more fully understand the representation of capital in this model, 
recognize that the production functions are based on a flow of  capital 
services. The income equations also include terms that represent pay- 
ments to foreigners for a flow of  capital services. However, the capital 
services available in a country will be proportional to the stock of capital 
located in it, and this stock will change when the location of  capital 
internationally shifts. The relocation of capital represents a stock adjust- 
ment which could be written in terms of  the actual capital stocks. To 
simplify notation, though, separate terms are not introduced to represent 
them. Rather, because available capital stocks always are assumed to be 
proportional to the physical flows of capital services (e.g. ,  machine hours 
per year), both the stock of  capital in country i and the flow of  capital 
services available in country i are assumed to be represented by Kj. 
It is assumed  that  capital  goods in A  are identical  to those in  B. 
However,  they  are not  transported  physically  from  one  country  to 
another. Therefore, any capital reallocation implicitly is based on the 
situation where capital depreciates in the country losing capital, while 
new capital is produced in the country gaining it. In each country, capital 
is assumed to be manufactured from the five available goods in the same 
proportions as consumers demand them. Capital goods are therefore 
equivalent to the average consumption good in each country. Actual 
depreciation rates and gross investment decisions are not included in the 
model, which gives net outputs and the new reallocation of  capital. 
The new equilibrium allocation of  the world capital stock depends on 
relative after-tax rates of  return and is represented by 
The CPI terms represent  a price index for each country.  The rate of 
return in a country depends on the value of  the marginal product of 
physical capital, r, and its price of  capital, CPI. Because DISC results in 
lower prices of capital goods abroad, CPIB, the percentage rate of return 289  Domestic International Sales Corporation 
abroad does not fall in the same proportion as the fall in the value of the 
marginal product of capital abroad, rB. Ignoring this price of capital effect 
would result in a larger projected shift of capital into the United States 
than would actually occur. The model would yield the same results if  it 
were expressed in terms of the percentage rate of return, i, and the cost of 
capital goods, c, presented earlier in the Hall-Jorgenson framework. 
Of  the ten demand equations referred to above, only nine are consid- 
ered explicitly in  order to set  quantity demanded  equal to quantity 
supplied in five markets and thereby close the model. Thus, this model 
consists of  twenty-seven equations (six full-employment equations, six 
zero-profit equations, nine commodity-demand equations, one interna- 
tional capital flow equation, and five market balance equations) to deter- 
mine changes in six industry outputs, six factor rewards, nine quantities 
demanded, five relative prices, and the flow of capital internationally. All 
equations are expressed  in  percentage rates of  change,  as shown in 
appendix B, which is the form in which the model is applied to predict 
percentage changes in outputs, factor rewards, and capital flows as a 
result of  DISC. This method of  analysis differs from the approach of 
Goulder et al., which works from levels of outputs and factor rewards to 
predict  final levels of  these variables.  The changes in these variables 
predicted here would be expected to give a close approximation to any 
solution based on the more general technique of Goulder et al., since the 
effects of  DISC are quite small in relation to the U.S. economy. Thus, 
any interaction terms ignored in the process of  differentiating the model 
should be insignificant. 
8.3.2  The Case of  Industry-Specific Capital 
The alternative case of  industry-specific capital requires no modifica- 
tion of  the demand side of the model. With respect to supply conditions, 
if the capital currently employed in each industry is regarded as specific to 
that industry, then in each country three full-employment equations for 
the three categories of  capital replace the single previous equation. Thus, 
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Allowing for industry-specific  capital means that six different returns to 
capital must be determined. Therefore, the zero-profit equations (7) to 
(12) must be rewritten in terms of  these separate variables. 
Also, the reallocation of  capital no longer is summarized in terms of 
perfect  mobility  domestically  and  some degree  of  mobility interna- 
tionally. Rather, if capital employed in a single sector is to expand, it 
must  be attracted from other sectors, but  in no case is this transfer 
costless. An example of  the framework considered is as follows: 
~~ANB  .-- 
[:;A  /$B]  ' 
Capital is assumed to be more mobile from one country to another in the 
same industry than it is between different industries in the same country, 
because owners of capital have specialized knowledge about their present 
industry. Thus,  is assumed to be smaller than gU1B, for example. 
Costs of  transferring capital from outside the industry and outside the 
country are assumed to be even higher, so that g1ANB is smaller than 
g1Au. Also, since 
aKIA  =  -aKU 
a(r1A/r2A)  a('lAlr2A)  ' 
(23) 
for example, the values of  the gii across the different capital-flow equa- 
tions are not independent. Similar equations are introduced for KU, 
KNA,  KIB,  and K~B- 
The four additional capital-flow equations plus the four additional 
full-employment conditions represent the modifications to be included in 
the model with industry-specific capital. This thirty-five equation system 
determines changes attributable to DISC in six industry outputs, ten 
factor rewards, nine commodity demands, five relative output prices, and 
five capital flows. Again, the differentiated form of the complete model is 
presented in appendix B. 
8.4 
As stated in the introduction, few unambiguous results can be deduced 
a priori in this model, and any conclusions drawn will depend on the set of 
parameter values considered to  be most appropriate. The  three aggregate 
goods were created on the basis of industry information reported in the 
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1972, eighty-five-sector, input-output table of  the United States. Non- 
traded goods and services, XNA,  basically were considered to be utilities, 
construction, transportation  and communication, wholesale and retail 
trade, social and personal services, finance, banking and real estate, and 
government. Net export goods, X,,  where an export surplus was re- 
ported in 1972, essentially were grains, chemicals, and machinery. Net 
import goods, XI,,  where imports exceeded exports in 1972, included 
many consumer durables and nondurables. 
Factor intensities of  production are based on the value-added figures 
from the input-output table. Direct and indirect capital and labor require- 
ments for each of  the three aggregate sectors are calculated from the 
direct value-added shares and the matrix of direct and indirect intermedi- 
ate input requirements reported  at the eighty-five-sector level. These 
data alone only allow the breakdown of  factor requirements to distin- 
guish between capital and labor, and therefore additional information is 
necessary to  decompose the labor requirements into skilled and unskilled 
components. The basis for that distinction is information on industry 
employment made available by Professor Robert Baldwin. This employ- 
ment figure is multiplied by the annualized minimum wage to indicate the 
return to unskilled  labor in an industry, and the remainder of  labor 
value-added is attributed to skilled labor. By assuming that wage rates 
across industries are identical, these value-added figures also can be used 
to  infer  the  physical  allocation  of  resources  implicit  in  the  full- 
employment equations. 
With respect to general statements characterizing U.S. industry, the 
nontraded sector has above average capital requirements, unskilled labor 
requirements well above average, and skilled labor requirements well 
below average. The export sector has skilled labor requirements well 
above average, and unskilled labor requirements well below average, 
while the import sector is slightly less skill intensive and slightly more 
unskilled labor intensive than exports. These findings  are roughly consist- 
ent with studies of  the factor content of  trade (Branson and Monoyios 
1977; Bowen 1980) concerning the skill intensity of  exports versus im- 
ports. However, much larger factor requirement differences exist be- 
tween both tradable sectors and the nontradable sector. 
Partial elasticities of substitution between capital and unskilled labor, 
unskilled labor and skilled labor, and capital and skilled labor do not 
appear to be well established. A survey piece on this subject by Hamer- 
mesh and Grant (1980) indicates that most studies deal only with the 
breakdown of production workers versus nonproduction workers, which 
cannot be easily related to differential amounts of human capital in each 
category of workers. Grant’s dissertation (1979) provides estimates based 
on data where years of  educational attainment could be distinguished, 
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sectional estimates relative to those based on time series. His figures are 
adapted to give the following set of figures applied to all industries in the 
study: UKL = uLs = .60, and uKs = .05. In other words, a very low 
degree of substitution between capital and skilled labor is assumed rela- 
tive to the other trade-offs in factor usage. 
Demand elasticities are generated from the assumption of utility tree 
functions of  the following form: 
(24) 
(25) 
uA  = uA  3  xlB)  (xM X2B) 7  xNAl  * 
UB  = UB[(xlA,  xl13),  (XU,  x2B),  XNB1. 
If  this nested utility function is CES in form, then as shown by Armington 
(1969), own and cross-price elasticities of demand can be derived directly 
from information regarding expenditure shares and elasticities of  sub- 
stitution at different levels of  the utility tree. For example, the own and 
cross-price elasticities of  demand for Xu  sold in country A will be 
(26)  NlA,lA = (1 -  SlA) u1  +  7 
(27)  NIA,lB = (l -  SIA)  (‘l  -  Nl) 9 
where SU is the share of  the budget spent on XI  which is allocated to 
XI,, u1  is the elasticity of substitution between x1A  and X,, ,  and Nl is the 
elasticity of demand for the aggregate commodity Xl. To form a consist- 
ent aggregate such as Xl requires that the income elasticity of  demand for 
x1A and XIB  be identical, and in this study all income elasticities are set 
equal to one. The elasticity of substitution between the two traded goods 
in the same utility tree is assumed to be 3, the corresponding elasticity 
between the three general categories XI, X2,  and XN  is assumed to be 
1.25, and the elasticity of  demand for all current consumption as an 
aggregate is -1.  As examples of what these values imply with respect to 
more commonly estimated parameters, the import elasticity of demand in 
the United States for XIB  equals -  2.69, and the elasticity of demand for 
U.S. exports of  X,  to the rest of  the world equals -2.79. 
Information regarding flows of capital internationally is quite limited, 
as is information with respect  to the initial division of  capital across 
countries.  Bowen  (1980)  estimates  that  in  1975 the  United  States 
accounted for roughly one-third of the world’s capital stock. The mobility 
of capital internationally represents one of  the weakest links empirically 
in the present model, and therefore different values of capital responsive- 
ness are simulated to test the sensitivity of  the results to the somewhat 
arbitrary assignment of  values. 
Although the  general degree of capital mobility is varied in simulations 
for both specifications of  the model, in the case of industry-specific  capital 
a single set of  values is used to represent  differences in the cost of 
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countries in the same traded good industry is assumed to be twice as 
responsive to rate of  return differentials as capital flowing from other 
industries in the same country, and ten times as responsive as capital 
flowing from other industries in the opposite country. For example, from 
equation (23) the following relationship among coefficients holds: gMle 
To estimate the direct effect of  DISC on export prices, start with the 
tax saving per dollar of export sales, which was .94 percent in 1979. If 
DISC were eliminated and exporters increased their prices to maintain 
after-tax returns, their taxable income would increase. For example, if 
they increased prices by 1  percent, their after-tax income would only go 
up by .54 percent of sales and tax liability by .46  percent, with a 46 percent 
tax rate. Therefore, to regain the full .94 percent loss in tax benefits, 
exporters would have to raise their prices by .94/.54 or 1.74 percent. This 
is the estimated DISC impact on export prices. 
DISC resulted in a reduction in the cost of capital in export production 
of 11.4 percent in 1979. We assume that the change in the marginal cost of 
capital is equal to  the change in the average cost. The marginal cost is not 
estimated directly because of  the difficulty in implementing the Hall- 
Jorgenson formula on a comprehensive scale. The estimate of the change 
in the average cost of capital is based in part on the various components of 
the net  cost of  capital in the corporate sector computed by Ballard, 
Fullerton,  Shoven,  and Whalley  (1982).  These include  the after-tax 
corporate profits,  federal and local corporate income taxes, property 
taxes, and interest paid. A federal corporate tax rate is computed after 
adding back investment tax credits to corporate liabilities because, as 
noted above, DISC represents an approximately 18.3 percent reduction 
in corporate taxes before credits. This 18.3  percent reduction in taxes is 
used to compute a new post-DISC level of corporate taxes, holding the 
amount of  after-tax profits constant. This is then used to compute a new 
aggregate cost of  capital which reflects the lower tax  attributable to 
DISC. The incentive to substitute capital for labor in the production of 
XI, and Xu  depends on this cost reduction and the share of  industry 
output which is exported.  Because the share of  Xu  output which is 
exported is five times greater than the share of  X, output which is 
exported, DISC has a much greater effect on factor proportions in Xu 
than in XI, production. 
The estimated effects of  DISC on the cost of  capital and on export 
prices are based on the average tax saving by exporters per dollar of sales 
and investment income.  One reason why the marginal incentive may 
differ  from the average in this context  is the incremental provisions 
introduced in 1976. For an additional dollar worth of  exports, the DISC 
would in 1979  obtain a full deferral rate of 50 percent, but there would be 
some loss in  later years because the base for computing incremental 
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exports in future years increases. It turns out that in 1979 the marginal 
deferral rate would have been equal to the average observed rate if firms 
used a 12 percent discount rate. 
The estimated effects of  DISC on prices and on the cost of  capital 
assume that any deferral of  tax through the use of a DISC is the equiva- 
lent to the exemption of  tax, that is, the deferral can be indefinite. The 
retained  earnings of  a DISC have to be invested in certain specified 
“qualified” export assets, but this limitation does not seem to be signifi- 
cant. This is suggested by the fact that actual dividends by DISCs to their 
parents in 1979 were only 73 percent of the distributions assumed under 
the DISC rules. Furthermore, total DISC assets grew much faster than 
they would have simply from retained earnings. All of  this means that 
DISCs could profitably use assets substantially in excess of those they had 
to hold to prevent the taxation of previously deferred income. 
8.5  Empirical Results: A Positive Analysis 
Projected changes in output  and the allocation of  capital  interna- 
tionally are reported in table 8.1. The corresponding changes in factor 
rewards and output prices are reported in table 8.2. For each of the two 
different  model  specifications (homogeneous versus  industry-specific 
capital), three sets of values are reported to demonstrate how sensitive 
the results of  the model are to the extent of capital mobility internation- 
ally. The  polar case of no international capital mobility, g = 0, is included 
to demonstrate what limiting values will be reached as mobility declines. 
Table 8.1  Projected Impacts on Output and Capital Utilization from DISC 
(ell figures represent percentage changes) 
Case of  Homogeneous  Case of  Industry-Specific 
Capital  Capital 
Vari- 
able  g= 100  g= 1  g=o  g=100  g=l  g=o 
-  ,067  -  ,069  -  ,078  -  ,068  -  .011  ,401  XIA 
x2A  302  ,800  ,791  ,800  .447  -  ,326 
-  ,063  -  .064  -  ,068  -  .062  -  .036  -  ,150  XNA 
Xl  B  ,091  ,092  ,097  .091  .072  ,031 
-  .057  -  .056  -  ,052  -  .056  -  ,014  .052 
XNB 
KA  .038  .031  .Ooo 
.042  ,036  ,010  ,038  -  ,056  ,000 
K2A  1.256  1.252  1.227  1.250  ,908  ,000 
-  .085  -  .092  -  .126  -  ,083  -  .049  ,000 
-  -  -  ,085  ,063  ,000 
-  -  -  -  ,061  -  .022  ,000 
xZB 
-  .038  -  ,037  -  ,036  -  .038  -  .030  -  .015 
-  -  - 
KNA 
Ki  B 
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Table 8.2  Projected Impacts on Prices and Factor Rewards from DISC 
(all figures represent percentage changes) 
Case of  Homogeneous  Case of  Industry-Specific 
Capital  Capital 
Vari- 




















-  ,099 
,100 
,003 
-  ,661 
-  .607 




-  ,633 
-  ,634 
-  .601 
-  .022 
-  .635 
-  .lo1 
,092 
.024 
-  ,664 
-  ,620 




-  .636 
-  ,637 
-  ,604 
-  .023 
-  ,638 
-  ,110 
,054 
,130 
-  ,680 
-  ,614 




-  .655 
-  .654 
-  ,623 
-  .025 
-  ,656 





-  ,661 
-  .611 
- 
- 
-  .607 
-  .607 
-  ,608 
,045 
,056 
-  ,633 
-  ,634 
-  ,601 
-  .022 
-  ,635 
-  .065 
.079 
- 
-  ,003 
1.138 
-  ,028 
-  .620 
-  ,576 
-  ,543 
-  ,548 
-  ,610 
.037 
,271 
-  ,589 
-  ,592 
-  ,572 
-  ,010 
-  ,599 
- 
-  ,221 
-  ,175 
-  ,804 
3.547 
,888 
-  ,802 
-  ,778 
-  ,574 
-  ,372 
-  ,861 
-  ,327 
.558 
-  .754 
-  .721 
-  ,765 
-  ,084 
-  .781 
- 
Projections obtained from parameter values greater than g  = 100 are not 
very different from those reported, and consequently the values obtained 
at g  = 100 represent an alternative extreme. 
8.5.1 
The outcome from the model based on homogeneous national capital 
will be discussed first. In the case of the United States, output of the net 
export good, Xu,  rises, while output of  the net import good and the 
nontraded good both fall. The decline in output in the nontraded sector is 
not  surprising, since the DISC incentives draw resources into export 
production and out of other sectors of the economy. XI,  output declines 
as a consequence of the balance-of-payments constraint imposed. If  the 
value of U.S.  exports rises, then the rest of the world must export more to 
the United States, a result that is achieved by a fall in the price of country 
B’s output relative to country A’s domestic prices. The net import sector 
is most affected by this reaction, and its output falls. The greatest increase 
in Xu output occurs when capital is most mobile internationally, since 
additional resources can be attracted without driving up input costs as 
much. The greatest declines in Xu and XNA  output occur when capital is 
least mobile, since the greater incentive to substitute capital for other 
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factors of production in X,,  output now can be satisfied only by attracting 
it out of  the other domestic sectors, Xu and XNA. 
Within country B, output of XI,  rises while output of  the other two 
composite goods falls. When capital is not as mobile internationally, 
domestic output in country B does not fall as much, since more capital is 
available to use in production within the country. The reallocation of 
capital to the United States occurs because U.S. after-tax returns rise. 
This result cannot be guaranteed a priori, since expansion of U.S. export 
production may require other factors more intensively than capital and 
thereby offset the factor price  incentive which increases demand for 
capital. However, that situation does not arise given the relevant set of 
parameter values in each economy. 
The impact effect of  the DISC incentive represents a reduction of  .46 
percent in the U.S. economy-wide gross capital return required to main- 
tain given after-tax returns, but even in the case where near-perfect 
capital mobility is assumed, the U.S. capital stock increased by only .038 
percent. This capital reallocation is not as large as Horst (1981) projects. 
Possible explanations for this difference are the attention paid to real 
versus nominal capital returns in the United States and abroad, and the 
allowance for more than one producing sector in the rest of the world. 
When foreign capital prices fall relative to U.S. prices, then less new 
investment is likely to be made in the United States in comparison with 
the case of constant foreign prices. When more than one producing sector 
exists in the foreign economy, the elasticity of  the foreign demand for 
capital schedule is likely to increase. The fact that the U.S. capital stock 
increases only slightly does not mean that capital mobility is unimportant, 
though, because changes in income distribution depend quite strongly 
on it. 
Wages of  unskilled labor are most adversely affected by DISC. Be- 
cause the export sector requires little unskilled labor, that labor can 
remain fully employed only by accepting a large cut in wages. Skilled 
labor is used intensively in the export sector, and when capital is highly 
mobile internationally, this factor gains the most in relative terms from 
DISC. However, as capital mobility declines internationally, so does the 
benefit to skilled labor from DISC. A smaller capital inflow into country 
A means a smaller increase in demand for output from A producers, or 
equivalently, less demand for the fixed factors, unskilled labor and skilled 
labor. While returns to unskilled labor fall for this reason, the effect on 
skilled labor is even more pronounced because of  the extremely low 
elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital. When demand 
for skilled labor falls, a large decline in its relative price is necessary to 
maintain full employment. Finally, a related result implied above is that 
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need not contend with the reallocation of  capital from the rest of  the 
world. 
Prices of U.S. traded goods rise slightly, but the U.S. terms of trade 
still fall by approximately two-thirds of the initial DISC price effect. That 
is, the price of imported foreign goods falls by roughly one-third of the 
1.74 percent  DISC price effect. The U.S. output shift toward traded 
goods forces a similar change in the rest of the world, as the nontraded 
sector declines in both countries. 
8.5.2  The Case of Industry-Specific Capital 
When the capital is industry specific, but nevertheless highly mobile 
internationally,  projected  effects of  DISC are very  similar to those 
already described: U.S. output of net exports, Xu, rises at the expense of 
Xu and XNA, while foreign output of net exports, XIB,  rises and output 
of  X,,  and XNB  falls; capital is reallocated toward X, production from 
elsewhere in the U.S. economy and from abroad; wages of  unskilled 
labor fall, and skilled labor gains. 
As capital mobility declines, capital initially in X,  becomes the spe- 
cific factor most likely to benefit from increased demand for X, or from 
the incentive to use K, rather than other inputs. In the polar case where 
g = 0, capital is immobile both internationally and across sectors within 
each economy. In that situation any resource reallocation across sectors is 
limited to skilled and unskilled labor, a situation differing considerably 
from the case of  g = 0 in the homogeneous capital model, where capital 
reallocation within the U.S. economy still was possible. Consequently, in 
the more restrictive situation depicted by the figures in the last column of 
tables 8.1 and 8.2, significant differences appear in comparison with any 
of the other results. Some of  these projections appear counterintuitive. 
For example, why does DISC result in a decline in the output of X, but 
an increase in the output of  XI,?  Exports of  both goods still rise, but 
domestic demand for Xu falls because of the relatively large increase in 
its prices. The contraction in the supply of X,  seems best explained in 
terms of a Rybczinski-like effect. Contraction of output of XNA  results in 
the release of skilled and unskilled labor, but since the nontraded sector is 
highly intensive in unskilled labor, that factor is released in relatively 
greater amounts than skilled labor. The net import sector, XIA,  requires 
slightly more unskilled labor than the net export sector, X,.  Therefore, 
the additional unskilled labor available would be absorbed by greater 
XI, output and reduced Xu  output, with skilled labor being released 
from X, to use with the additional unskilled labor in Xu. Perhaps this 
situation is of limited relevance in policy analysis, but if capital immobil- 
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suggest counterintuitive output incentives and a large windfall to owners 
of  capital in the export sector. 
An additional distinction that arises in the case of  industry-specific 
capital is the relatively smaller terms of trade deterioration, but a larger 
decline in  the value  of  foreign  investment  income.  These somewhat 
offsetting effects still leave a decline in U.S. income and its consequent 
demand implications, which were explained above. 
8.5.3  Comparison of  Partial and General Equilibrium Analysis 
One question of  interest in a policy context has been the projected 
effect of DISC on U.S. exports and employment in those industries. The 
DISC report  of  the U.S.  Treasury Department (1981)  estimates the 
change in the value of U.S. exports on the basis of  a partial equilibrium 
framework, where the label “partial equilibrium” is applied because of 
the lack of attention to balance-of-payments constraints. In other words, 
U.S.  exports are assumed  to increase,  and the balance-of-payments 
position of foreign countries is allowed to worsen with no pressure for 
adjustments on their part. Such a situation would represent an equilib- 
rium result only if the United States were willing to continually increase 
its lending to foreign borrowers irrespective of  rates of return. 
The general equilibrium model developed here projects an increase in 
exports of  3.1 percent. The increase in exports derived from a simple 
partial-equilibrium  analysis for  the  same export  demand  elasticities 
assumed here would yield a 4.9 percent increase in exports. In contrast, a 
Marshall-Lerner type of analysis, which attempts to go one step further 
than the simple partial analysis by computing the appreciation of  the 
dollar resulting from the initial “partial” expansion in exports and then 
recomputing the change in exports, results in an export expansion of 2.9 
percent. 
Why is the increase in exports in the general equilibrium model some- 
what  larger  than  in  the standard  Marshall-Lerner framework?  One 
reason is that the initial loss in U.S. income associated with the DISC 
subsidy is not introduced into the usual Marshall-Lerner analysis. This 
loss in income results from the necessity to finance the DISC incentive, 
that is, lowering export prices cannot be costless to the United States. 
Because U.S. consumption is strongly oriented to U.S.-produced goods, 
a loss in U.S. income tends to create an excess supply of U.S. production, 
limiting the appreciation of  the dollar necessary in the Marshall-Lerner 
analysis. 
8.6  Normative Analysis of DISC 
The welfare or economic efficiency effects of DISC must be evaluated 
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recognized.  The focus of  the present study on internationally mobile 
capital suggests an important set of  distortions to include: the set of 
international taxes on capital income. A  basic condition for DISC to 
improve world  efficiency is fairly stringent-DISC  must result in the 
reallocation of capital away from low-tax uses toward high-tax uses. This 
situation may arise if current foreign tax rates are lower than in  the 
United States, since U.S. tax code provisions allow the income of U.S.- 
controlled foreign corporations to avoid U.S. taxation until the income is 
repatriated to the United States. If  DISC causes U.S.-based multina- 
tional corporations (MNCs) to choose domestic over foreign locations, 
world efficiency  may be enhanced because capital would move to where it 
has a higher pre-tax return, even inclusive of  DISC benefits. 
The main problem with this second-best argument is that the United 
States is not now, at the corporate level, a high-tax country. The Com- 
merce Department benchmark survey, U.  S. Direct Investment Abroad, 
1977, indicates that in  1977 foreign  manufacturing  affiliates of  U.S. 
companies paid an average income tax rate of 42.0 percent. The compa- 
rable U.S. rate, including federal, state, and local taxes, on their parents 
was 45.8 percent. In addition, the U.S. rate on new investment has been 
reduced substantially since 1977 because of  ACRS and the other provi- 
sions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 (ERTA), even after the 
cutbacks in 1982 are considered. For example, the effective tax rate on 
new investment in equipment in manufacturing as a whole is now about 
what it was before ERTA for equipment used in exports. To the extent 
that DISC draws capital from abroad, it will come, on the average, from 
countries in which the corporate tax rate is at least as high as in the United 
States. 
Of course, from the standpoint of national welfare, the United States 
still can gain from the inflow of capital even when the world as a whole 
loses. Traditional analysis of international capital flows suggests some of 
the relevant factors to consider: the terms of  trade loss to the United 
States from subsidizing exports may be offset by the gain to the United 
States as a net creditor to the rest of the world, if real returns to capital 
rise internationally as a result of  DISC. Furthermore, since the United 
States collects little tax from U.S.-based multinational investments in 
high-tax countries, as a result of the foreign tax credit allowed up to the 
value  of  the U.S.  tax liability, the United  States will  gain from the 
reallocation of  capital into jurisdictions where U.S. rather than foreign 
taxes on capital are collected. Finally, if  capital is reallocated within the 
U.S.  economy from low-tax to high-tax sectors, a welfare gain will result. 
As shown in appendix C, the change in U.S. potential welfare as a 
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The first five terms represent the terms of  trade effect attributable to 
DISC, which is expected to be negative since the loss in U.S.  export 
receipts from the tax subsidy is not completely offset by cheaper imports. 
The next four terms represent the potential gain to the United States 
from  the reallocation  of  capital both  within the United  States from 
low-tax to high-tax sectors and also from abroad. If  there were no taxes 
levied at home or abroad, and capital could be moved across borders 
costlessly, these four terms would sum to zero. The r;  term shows the 
U.S. gain as a net creditor to the rest of  the world if  the real return to 
capital rises abroad, and the final two terms are the gain in U.S. tariff 
revenue collected if the value of imports rises. 
This expression is evaluated for the three sets of  simulated values 
reported from the model based on homogeneous capital.  The corre- 
sponding expression  for the case of  industry-specific capital requires 
modifying the capital flow terms to include industry-specific rates of 
return and allowing for the U.S. net creditor position with respect to the 
three different types of capital used in country B. In all cases the United 
States experiences a welfare loss as a result of  DISC. In the case of 
homogeneous capital this loss is smaller when capital mobility is larger, 
but in the case of  heterogeneous capital just the opposite result holds. 
Assuming DISC applies to all U.S. exports, the estimated annual losses 
in the case of homogeneous capital are .037 percent of national income 
when capital is highly mobile (g  = loo), .037 percent of income when 
capital is moderately mobile (g = l),  and .040 percent when capital is 
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welfare loss estimates are .041, .039, and .030 percent of income for the 
three cases analyzed, as reported in descending order of capital mobility. 
These net efficiency effects equal approximately half of  the revenue 
cost of  DISC, a percentage much higher than generally is obtained in the 
analysis of  domestic tax policies. While the DISC-induced welfare loss 
appears small as a percentage of national income, in absolute value this 
estimate is more than three times the projected gain to the United States 
from a 50 percent pre-Tokyo  Round multilateral tariff reduction (Bald- 
win, Mutti, and Richardson  1980). Furthermore, the tariff  reduction 
policy results in an increase in exports nearly twice that of  DISC. The 
primary reason that the DISC welfare effects are so large relative to the 
volume of  trade affected is that DISC results in a substantial terms of 
trade loss to the United States, and reallocation of capital into the United 
States is not sufficient to offset that loss. 
8.7  Qualifications 
The results discussed above clearly are dependent on the parameter 
values chosen as well as the way each model is formulated. The theoreti- 
cal framework and the empirical basis for the parameter values used were 
discussed previously, but additional points are raised here. 
One possibility ignored is the incentive for greater capital formation 
from the increase in the after-tax return to capital. The greater the 
responsiveness of  savings to this rate of return, the larger the increase in 
U.S. output which eventually will be realized, and the larger the tax base 
from which to make up the DISC revenue loss. Goulder, Shoven, and 
Whalley (1981) simulate such a scenario in five-year  intervals, to illustrate 
the path of  adjustment followed by the economy, while Horst (1981) 
considers the new steady-state solution and an intermediate position in 
which one-fifth of  the eventual adjustments have been made. The pro- 
jected effect of  DISC on total savings is not unambiguous on a priori 
grounds. The higher real rate of  return does give a price incentive for 
additional saving, but the loss in real income may reduce saving. 
Also, the quantitative analysis in this paper has assumed that export 
markets are competitive. If  the model were expanded to  include noncom- 
petitive behavior and added elements, such as variable advertising in- 
tensity, the results may differ in various ways. One change would involve 
the calculated reduction in the marginal cost of  capital attributable to 
DISC. In the estimates described earlier, we  assumed that all of  the 
marginal after-tax return to capital in exports was made up of the com- 
petitive, required real rate of  return. If, on the contrary, some of  the 
return reflects monopoly rents, the decline in the marginal cost of capital 
because of DISC would be smaller than we have estimated it to be. The 
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fore be somewhat overstated in our estimates, while the gain to monop- 
oly producers at the expense of the other factor inputs would be ignored. 
It is also conceivable that, if exporters have the opportunity to increase 
advertising and marketing efforts, the decline in export prices may be less 
than indicated in a simple model. The welfare loss because of the decline 
in the terms of trade may for that reason also be overstated, but with a 
somewhat larger, but not necessarily compensating, loss because of over- 
investment in marketing. However, it is not clear why a decline in capital 
costs should lead to disproportionate increases in advertising. Further- 
more, the statement by some market observers that DISC does not lower 
an exporter’s prices may simply reflect the fact that export markets are 
competitive, and that a single exporter cannot affect market prices. In 
that  case, the market supply shifts assumed in our model would be 
appropriate. 
8.8  Related Policy Concerns 
The main purpose of  this paper has been to explain the incentives 
created by the DISC program and to project how they might alter the 
location of  production  internationally and the factor rewards in the 
United  States and abroad.  Several other policy aspects of  the DISC 
program have not been addressed in this analysis, and these issues are 
discussed briefly to conclude the paper. 
One issue not considered is the effect of  alternative tax policies on 
production  and factor rewards. If  the United States were to adopt a 
corporate tax cut resulting in the same revenue loss as DISC, would 
returns to capital rise to a greater extent and attract a greater inflow of 
capital into the United States? Would the changes in income distribution 
be similar to those created by  DISC? These questions of  differential 
incidence actually were implicit in the 1978 tax proposals of  the Carter 
administration. A similar framework in which to consider these trade-offs 
would be to impose a balanced budget constraint, and to consider any 
disincentives that would arise from tax increases necessary to make up  for 
the tax expenditures on DISC. The present study does not obtain Horst’s 
(1981) result that the DISC revenue loss is largely made up by additional 
taxes  collected  from  the  reallocated  capital,  primarily  because  he 
assumes a much larger differential in taxes on capital income across 
different sectors of the U.S. economy than the figures reported by Bal- 
lard, Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1982). 
Another issue that frequently arises is the relationship between the 
DISC provisions and border tax adjustments in the form of  rebates on 
value-added  and other  “indirect”  taxes  on exports.  It is  sometimes 
claimed that DISC is simply the equivalent of  these border tax adjust- 
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partners in having a greater portion of  its tax revenue in the form of 
“direct” taxes, such as the corporate income tax. 
While the GATT distinction between rebates on direct and indirect 
taxes lacks a sound theoretical basis, previous analysis consistent with the 
model in this paper makes it clear that DISC is not the equivalent of 
border tax adjustments on indirect taxes (Johnson and Krauss 1970). The 
reason is that border tax adjustment practices involve not only a rebate of 
taxes on exports but also the imposition of  the indirect tax (such as the 
value-added tax) on similar imports. This imposition of taxes on imports 
prevents the allocational and terms of  trade effects that have been the 
subject of  this paper. Resources do not flow out of  import-competing 
goods because the tax on imports restores the relative competitiveness of 
domestically produced goods. The imposition of taxes on imports at the 
same time as the rebate on exports means that the terms of trade do not 
tend to  fall for the exporting country, unlike the case of DISC, because in 
real terms the export supply schedule is not shifted in the same way. This 
is not to say that border tax adjustments as implemented by EEC  coun- 
tries are completely neutral. Because value-added taxes are typically of 
the consumption type, that is, they exempt capital goods, they are not 
uniform, and border tax adjustments do have an effect. However, they 
do not necessarily give any trade advantage to the countries using them. 
A related observation is that if the main justification for DISC rests on 
its foreign trade impacts, rather than its ability to increase capital forma- 
tion or to raise U.S. national income, then a complete analysis of DISC 
should compare it to alternative ways of meeting export goals. The other 
major U.S. export incentive program is the Export-Import Bank, which 
provides various kinds of  credit-financing assistance to exporters. The 
Export-Import Bank would appear to have some advantages over DISC 
in terms of relative effectiveness. For one thing, it can target on exports 
whose demand is most elastic. Apart from any mercantilistic considera- 
tions, targeting on highly elastic demands may be beneficial in reducing 
the terms of  trade loss that results from an export incentive. In some 
extreme cases, subsidizing the highly elastic exports may improve overall 
terms of trade. However, the first-best policy would be simply to impose 
taxes on the exports with lower elasticities. 
Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear that the Export-Import Bank is 
successful in focusing on highly elastic imports, even though its proce- 
dures explicitly attempt to do so. The main problem is that, by its nature, 
the Export-Import Bank is limited to assisting large, durable equipment 
exports such as commercial aircraft and electrical generating equipment. 
It can offer few benefits to the wide range of industrial materials, such as 
chemicals and semiconductors, whose demand may be highly elastic. The 
limited scope of the  Export-Import Bank can be seen from the fact that all 
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ance, assisted $18.1 billion of exports in fiscal year 1980.  The comparable 
figure for DISC exports is above $130 billion, including almost $100 
billion of  manufactured exports. 
The Export-Import Bank may have one advantage in that it may be an 
effective threat against foreign subsidies. Its financing can be targeted to 
exports competing against products receiving subsidies from other gov- 
ernments, and it can be  withdrawn when foreign subsidies are eliminated. 
But, here again, the Export-Import Bank’s scope is relatively narrow 
because it is directed only against foreign credit subsidies and not the 
whole range of foreign intervention. 
Finally, Export-Import Bank programs have an effect on capital flows 
which differs  from DISC and is undesirable from the U.S. point of view. 
In contrast to DISC, which lowers the cost of capital in the U.S. export 
sector, the Export-Import Bank’s primary effect is to lower the cost of 
capital to foreign users of  US.-made equipment. Export-Import Bank 
programs would be expected to cause a capital outflow from the United 
States. 
In addition to these economic issues, there is the significant  legal issue 
regarding the consistency of DISC with U.S. obligations to the GATT. In 
July 1972, soon after the enactment of the DISC legislation, the Euro- 
pean Economic Community (EEC) filed a complaint in GATT that the 
DISC provisions constituted an export subsidy under article XVI:4 of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which states that contracting 
parties shall cease to grant subsidies on the export of any product (other 
than a primary product) which results in the price of  the export being 
lower than the comparable price in domestic markets. The remission or 
exemption of  direct (income) taxes on exports was also specifically in- 
cluded in a 1960 GATT illustrative list of  prohibited subsidy measures. 
After the EEC filed its complaint, the United States in turn filed com- 
plaints against Belgium, France, and the Netherlands on the grounds that 
their territorial tax systems, which exempt foreign income, resulted in 
export subsidies because the income of foreign sales affiliates in low-tax 
countries did not reflect arm’s-length prices on sales from the parent. 
In November 1976, the GATT panels which reviewed the DISC and 
related cases found that DISC as well as the challenged tax practices of 
the three EEC countries violated article XVI. In December 1981, the 
GATT Council, which is an assembly of all members, accepted the panel 
report subject to the qualification that: (a) economic processes located 
outside a country, including those involving exported goods, need not be 
taxed by the exporting country; (b) transactions between exporting enter- 
prises and foreign buyers must adhere to arm’s-length principles; and (c) 
article XVI:4  does not prohibit the adoption of  measures to relieve 
double taxation of foreign-source income. The United States agreed to 
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did  not  accept  the conclusion of  the panel  report  that  DISC was  a 
violation of  article XVI:4. It interpreted the qualifying statement as an 
exoneration of  DISC. 
Even though the United States refused to acknowledge that DISC 
violated the GATT, it recognized that the unresolved DISC issue greatly 
inhibited its ability to bring claims on other issues to the GATT. There- 
fore the  United States announced at a GATT Council meeting in October 
1982 that, while not conceding the issue, it would present a legislative 
proposal to the Congress which would address the concerns of its trading 
partners. However, as of the end of  1982, it was not clear whether these 
legislative proposals would involve the simple elimination of  the DISC 
incentive or  the  transformation of DISC into some GATT legal form with 
the same tax benefits to exporters. 
Appendix A 
The following model demonstrates the incentives which DISC creates for 
a typical firm. The firm is assumed to maximize after-tax profits from its 
sales in the United States and abroad. Production can be sold domesti- 
cally or in the export market, and deductible production costs are pro- 
rated on the basis of  output shares in each market. The expression to 
maximize is: 
= (1 -  ~IA)[PIAA~IAA  - -  (rBK + wL)]  -  r(1- B)  K 
+ l1  -  flA(l -  D)IIPIABXIAB -  xlAB  -  (rBK + wL)] 
xlA 
XlA 
+  [XIA(K, L, -  xlAA  -  xlABl  9 
where P~AA  is the price charged for sales of XI,  in country A,  Xi,,  is the 
volume of sales of Xu  in country A,  B is the share of  capital financed by 
bonds or debt,  r is the after-tax return to capital received by lenders, tu  is 
the tax rate on corporate income, and D  is the tax saving from DISC. 
Differentiating this expression with respect to Xu,  and Xi,,  yields 
two  first-order conditions which can  be  set equal to each other and 
manipulated to give 
rBK + WL 
Let [(rBK + WL)/PuAXlA]  equal 0,  and recognize that 0  is the share of 
receipts accounted for by deductible production costs. Correspondingly, 306  John Mutti/Harry Grubert 
(1 - 0) represents the return to equity capital as a share of  sales. 
Therefore, 
PUB  =  1 -  fl~  [I- 01  + 0, 
PIAA  1 -  ti~(1-  0) 
which shows that if  there is no return to equity capital, then 0  = 1  and 
DISC provides no incentive to charge a lower price in export markets. 
The smaller 0  is, the more significant  DISC  is in encouraging a price gap 
in favor of  exports. 
DISC  also leads to an incentive to substitute capital for labor, since it 
reduces the penalty on equity capital because of  the corporate income 
tax. Differentiating the profit expression with respect to K and L yields 
two first-order expressions from which the ratio of marginal productive- 
ness can be formed: 
--  MPL -  (1 -   ti^) ~AA  w + [I -  fi~(1-  011 ~ABW 
MPK  (1 -  tlA)$lAABr + rB f [1 -  tlA(1 -  0)]  $~ABBY  ’ 
where $1AA is the share of output sold in country A.  This expression can 
be written in terms of  percentage rates of change in a quite compact form 
if  it is assumed that the initial position is one of no DISC incentive: 
-  (IpB)  dtlA 
(1 -  tlA  B,  -  tlA 
The terms on the right-hand side demonstrate how tax policy changes 
alter the relative cost of  using capital and labor. 
Appendix B 
In this appendix the two general equilibrium models are expressed in 
terms of percentage rates of change of all variables. The model based on 
homogeneous (H) capital nationally is presented first. 
Full-Employment Equations 
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Where A$  is the share of the total stock of factor i used in the production 
of  good j  in country k;  8;  is the share of  the value of  output of  good j 
attributable to factor  i in country k; uim  is  the partial  elasticity of 
substitution between factors  i andj  in the production of good m in country 
k;  and +ijk is the percentage of  output of  good i produced in country j 
which is sold in country k.  DISC is the percentage reduction in the cost of 
capital used in the production of  goods for export. The use of an asterisk 
signifies the percentage change in a variable. 
(H2) Skilled labor in country A: 
CSlXlA  + cS2x2A  + cSNxNA =  sA. 
A  A  A2 
A$  XrA + A&XL + A&PNA  -  (A& gl u?:  + As2 8  L2fTLS 
AA  + h$NefN'??)(q$  -  w$>  -  (ASleKlufi+  A$2%%2'&? 
+ k$N8&.pJ$;)(q;  -  r;) = si +  A$  8&&  +1ABDISClA 
4-  k$2@2ugg+~BDISC2A. 
(H3)  Capital in country A: 
C$lxlA + c&xu  + c&xNA  = KA . 
A",XzA  + Ae2XL  + A&XgA  -  (AKIOL1ufk+  AA  A&e&ufg 
+ A&A&U&)(Y$  -  w$)  -  (A&O&u$+  A&&U?: 
+ A&8&uGg)(ri  -  q2) = K2 -  (k",,8;3,U?k 
+ A&€&U$;)  +iABDISClA -  (A$288;3,~fi 
+ AK2eS2uKS)  &ABD1SC2A  * 
A  A  A2 
(H4)  Unskilled labor in country B: 
cf1xlB  f cf2x2B  f CfNXNB  =  LB. 
BB  BB 
AflxrB  f  Af2zB+  A",x&B-  (AL1oS1uf~+  AL2eS2uf2s 
+ k",@Nu??(wg  -  q$) -  (AB,18$1Ufi+  AfzB&Uf$ 
+  A&8",Ufg)(w$  -  rg) = L*,  . 
(H5) Skilled labor in country B: 
CglxIB  + Cf'x2,  + CghTxNB =  SB. 
A&X:~+  x&x~~+  A&xNB-  (~$~ef~uf~+  ~$ef~~f: 
BBB1 BBB2  +  A%efNuf?(q$  -  wi)  -  (ASloKluKS+ ASZoK2uKS 
+ hg;v8BK"gF)(q$ -  rg) = sg. 308  John MuttiIHarry Grubert 
Demand Equations in country A 
(H13)  Demand for X, in country A: 
DIAA =fi(plA,  plB, p&4, P2B7  yA). 
DLA  = EfAM  PfA  + ELIBPfB  + E&u  P& 
+ E&~BP&  + E&  Y2. 309  Domestic International Sales Corporation 
Where Diik  represents the quantity of good i produced in countryj  that is 
demanded in country k;  Eykl is the elasticity of demand of purchasers in 
country rn for good i produced in country  j with respect to a change in the 
price of good k produced in country 1; and EZj  is the income elasticity of 
demand of purchasers in country rn for good i produced in country j.  The 
percentage change in income is: 
+ TAR2A (P&j  + D&A) -  DISC REV. 
Where ITs  is the share of GNP accounted for by output of good i, TARiA 
represents the share of GNP in country A accounted for by tariff revenue 
collected from imports of good i, and DISC REV is the grossed up value 
of  the tax saving to exporters due to DISC. 310  John Mutti/Harry Grubert 
Demand Equations in country B 
Where the change in income is 
Capital-Flow Equation 
K;  = gl (r2 -  CPIT, -  r$  + CPI;)  . 
Market Equilibrium Conditions 
0323) XIA  = DIAB  + &AA. 
X;A = (P~ABDTAB  + ~AADTAA. 31  1  Domestic International Sales Corporation 312  John MuttVHarry Grubert 313  Domestic International Sales Corporation 
Zero-Profit Equations in Production 
(S11)  Production of  XIA  in country A: 
cfl wA + c&  qA + c$l rlA  /(I -  tlA) = PIA . 
e& ws + et1  qs + e",,rfA = pfA. 
(S12)  Production of  Xu  in country A: 
c&  WA + cf2  qA + c$2 r,  /( 1 -  l2A) =  P2A. 
ef2 w;  + ef2  + ei2rzA = PL . 
(S13) Production of  XNA  in country A: 
CfNWA  + C&qA  + C$NrNAl(l -  tNA) = PNA = 1, 
gNw2  +  6fNq; f e",Nr&A  = 0. 
(S14) Production of  in country B: 
ef1  wg + eg  q$ + eB,, rfB  = PT~. 
cfl wB + c?l  qE + czl rlB =  P1B  * 
(S15)  Production of  X2B  in country B: 
ef,  W$ + eB, q; + 0",rZB  = pZB. 
cf2wBf  c?2qB+fCBK;?rZB=p2B. 
(S16)  Production of  XNB  in country B: 
c!?NwB+  c:NqS+  czNrNB= pNB* 
efNw$fe?Nq;+eBKNr~B=P~B. 
The nine demand equations are identical to those presented in the 
model with homogeneous capital, equations (H13)  through (H21),  and 
they  are not repeated here. Also, the market  equilibrium conditions 
(H23)  through (H27)  are unchanged. However, because several types of 
capital exist in the present model, there are four additional international 
capital flow equations, and each involves more pairwise comp:irisons 
than in the simpler model. 
Capital Flow Equations 
(s31) K1A = hlA(rlA? r1B7  r2A, rNA7  r2B, rNB, cplA,  cplB)* 
KTA =  glAlB(rfA -  CPIi -  rg f CPI;)  f  glA,(rfA  -  r&) 
+  glAN,4(rfA -  r&A) +  glA2drfA -  cpls  -  r2*B + cpl$) 
+  glANB(rL -  CPI;  -  r&B f CPI;). 
(S32)  K2A =  h2A(r1A7  TlB, r2A,  r2B,  rNA7  rNB,  cplA,  cplB)* 
KZA =  g2A2B(r& -  CPIS -  r'& + CPI;)  +  gu1A(r& -  rfA) 
+  guNA(r& -  r&A) +  g,IB(r&  -  CPIs -  rfB  + CPI;) 
+  g2ANB(r& -  CPIs -  r&B f CPI;). 314  John Mutti/Harry Grubert 
Appendix C 
In this appendix the net efficiency or  welfare effects of adopting DISC are 
explained. An initial assumption is that a community welfare function 
exists, and its value depends on aggregate consumption of the five goods 
available within a country. More accurately, then, potential welfare is 
measured, since no attention is paid to the redistributive policies within 
the country determining actual welfare. This welfare function is repre- 
sented as 315  Domestic International Sales Corporation 
(All  UA = U(D1AA7  D1BA7  DMA7  D2BA7  DNA). 
Given  that  a price  ratio  equals the corresponding  ratio of  marginal 
utilities in equilibrium, a change in utility can be expressed as 
+ P2BdDMB + dDNA  7 
where UNA is the marginal utility of consuming an additional unit of XNA. 
Since there is no net  saving in this model, a change in  ,he  value of 
consumption must equal a change in the value of  income, which allows 
equation (A2) to be rewritten as: 
dU,  = dYA -  D1AAdPlA -  DlBAdPlB 
UNA 
(A3) 
-  D2AAdP2A -  D2BAdp2B. 
Although income was expressed in terms of output in the text, to analyze 
welfare changes it is more useful to work from the comparable definition 
in terms of  factor income: 
KU  + -  (‘A)  KM  (A4)  YA  = WALA  + qASA- 
-  tlA  1 -  tu 
f TARlA  *  P~B  DlBA + TARM  *  P~B  D~BA  -  DISCREV. 
Differentiating this equation results in an expression to use in equation 
(A3)  for dYA. Based on the zero-profit conditions in the production of 
X1A, Xu,  and XNA, the factor reward terms dwA, dgA, and drA can be 
eliminated, giving 
645) -  dUA = (x1A -  DmA)dPu + (XM -  DuA)dPM 
UNA 
-  DlBA dPiB -  D~BA  DPZB -  DISCREV 
-  r~  dKA + (Kd -  KA)(drB/CPIB -  rBdCPIB) 
+ TARIA  . d(piBDii?A)  +  *  d(p2BD2B~). 
The rB and CPIB terms require some explanation. They reflect the possi- 
bility that as capital abroad depreciates, it can be replaced by spending 316  John Mutti/Harry Grubert 
less than the initial allowance for depreciation because the real prices of 
capital goods have declined. Dividing both sides of the equation by  YA 
gives the percentage change in welfare as: 
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COlIlmeIlt  Stephen P. Magee 
This is a very comprehensive and, I think, quite competent paper on both 
theoretical and empirical considerations related to the DISC. I have only 
two brief comments. The firfit is that there is no necessary reason why we 
might expect  an increase in  the DISC to also be  associated with  an 
expansion of U.S. exports. If the DISC were obtained in an endogenous 
policy model in which resources are removed from export production in 
order to effect the adoption of  DISC, then the increase in rent seeking 
Stephen P. Magee is professor of  finance at the School of  Business of  the University of 
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could cause a decline in exports at the very time when the DISC is 
adopted. Of  course, this does not mean that the welfare of  exporting 
interests is harmed. The favorable tax benefits could easily offset the 
reduction in the quantity of  exports in such a way that the exporter’s 
welfare would improve. 
A second and related point is that in an endogenous policy model, 
causation does not run from the change in the policy to the change in 
exports. Rather, both exports and the policy itself are caused by other 
underlying determinants. 
Both of  these points are outside the scope of  the current model and 
should not be interpreted as a direct criticism of an obviously fine paper. 
Comment  William R. Cline 
John Mutti and Harry Grubert have provided an impressive analysis of 
the DISC. Their model brings out important effects that would be missed 
in a partial equilibrium approach. As a major example, it is only with a 
general equilibrium analysis that they are able to identify adverse effects 
of  the DISC on unskilled labor, arising primarily from the reduction of 
output and employment in nontraded goods caused by  reallocation of 
resources to exportables. 
Certain elements of  the model do raise questions. The basic price 
equations are composed only of factor costs; there is no treatment of costs 
of  intermediate inputs. Even considering that the model is aggregative 
and  therefore  that  intermediates  tend  to  disappear,  there  should 
nonetheless be inputs from even the three broad aggregate sectors into 
each other. Similarly, it is not apparent how the model takes into account 
imported intermediate inputs. 
It is noteworthy that the welfare effects cited  are small while the 
transfer effects are large; in this regard, the analysis of  DISC shows 
results symmetrical to those of  trade protection. 
The model results  are driven  crucially by the balance-of-payments 
constraint. This constraint is the main cause of a reduction of  output in 
the sector of  import substitutes (sector 1A). That is, with the balance of 
payments constrained to be unchanged, import substitutes at home must 
be partially replaced by  imported goods to compensate for the DISC- 
induced rise in exports. 
Other specifics warrant mention. The parameter 1.25 as an elasticity of 
substitution would seem high for categories as broad as the three econ- 
omy-wide categories used. (Can education services, good 3, readily be 
substituted in demand for grain, good 2, or oil, good 1?)  The results for 
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rate of return to capital in the partner country are puzzling: as the stock of 
capital in  country B declines because of  a reallocation of  capital away 
from B to country A,  it might have been expected that the rate of return 
to capital rises in response to greater scarcity; instead, it declines (table 
8.2). 
Despite  these  assorted  questions about  the model  itself,  it  would 
appear to provide  a useful representation of  the economic effects of 
DISC. My remaining comments therefore focus on the political economy 
of  DISC. In terms of the paper itself, the analysis brings out a powerful 
and heretofore unrecognized argument against DISC: this tax mecha- 
nism reduces jobs and output in import-competing industries. If labor and 
management in steel, automobiles, and textiles were aware of  this ana- 
lytical conclusion and agreed with it, DISC’S  days would be numbered. 
Even more significant politically, the main effect of  DISC identified by 
Mutti and Grubert is not that it increases U.S. exports, but instead that it 
reduces the wage of unskilled labor. This finding, a result of  the reduced 
output of  (labor-intensive) nontradables as resources shift to exports, 
should be a politically sensitive strike against DISC if past experience in 
the field of  import protection  (where impact on unskilled labor is a 
significant consideration) is any guide. 
It must be noted, however, that these key results turn on the assump- 
tion of  unchanged balance of  payments. Country B’s exports must in- 
crease to offset the rise in cduntry A’s exports. Yet the implicit assump- 
tion of the creators of DISC is just the opposite. DISC exists to increase 
the net trade balance of the United States, not to reshuffle workers and 
resources  from  import  substitutes to export products.  In  theoretical 
terms, that underlying political-economic premise cannot be justified 
except perhaps in periods of obvious overvaluation of the exchange rate. 
As it happens, however, the United States is currently in just such a 
period; the dollar is perhaps 20 percent above an equilibrium level, while 
the trade deficit for 1983 could reach $70 billion or more and the current 
account  deficit correspondimgly would  also be large. In this context, 
especially if  the dollar is to remain overvalued as the consequence of 
mismatch between tight monetary and loose fiscal policy (because of 
inability to act in reducing bqdget deficits), second-best instruments that 
do raise the trade balance (rather than leaving it unchanged, as in the 
Mutti-Grubert analysis) may be appropriate. If  DISC, the Export-Import 
Bank, and other export-stimulating devices are ever justified, it is in 
periods such as the present. 
Even in terms of the goals of  the legislators who created DISC, how- 
ever, it seems to be ineffective, judged by the Mutti-Grubert analysis. It 
increases exports only by 2 percent. This finding is not a great surprise, 
considering that its subsidy equivalent amounts to only 1.7  percent of the 
export price, which in turn teflects the fact that DISC reduces capital 320  John Mutti/Harry Grubert 
costs only by 11 percent, and capital costs themselves are only one-fifth of 
product price. 
The paper’s implicit policy recommendation is to use  the Export- 
Import Bank as the preferred vehicle for stimulating U.S.  exports (if that 
objective is taken as given), and more specifically, the Export-Import 
Bank’s support should be focused on those U.S. exports that are price- 
elastic in foreign demand. That is, the United States should be a price- 
discriminating monopolist. 
Other major issues arise in a broader policy context than that directly 
addressed by the Mutti-Grubert study. Perhaps the most important is that 
DISC is the Achilles’ heel of U.S. policy on trade subsidies. Subsidies are 
certain to be a key area of trade conflict in the 1980s and beyond. Other 
countries are emphasizing industrial policies, and that strategy inevitably 
means subsidies. In some cases the results of these subsidies are and will 
be trade distorting. But the United States will not be in a credible position 
to insist on greater adherence of  the EEC, Japan, and others to GATT 
principles on subsidies as long as the DISC stands in flagrant violation of 
those principles. It is important for U.S. ability to negotiate that DISC be 
abolished or at least reformed. 
If  DISC is eliminated, some substitute will  be needed in practical 
political terms. The Export-Import Bank is the best substitute. Unfortu- 
nately, it is not trusted as a permanent alternative because administra- 
tions have found it too easy to cut its funding in the past. Moreover, the 
Export-Import Bank is viewed to some extent as narrowly concentrated 
in  favor of  large firms, such as aircraft producers, while DISC is an 
across-the-board instrument. 
For its part, the Reagan administration is committed to the elimination 
of  DISC and its replacement by  something that is compatible with the 
GATT. Just what that might be remains unclear. 
One proposed alternative would be the FISC-a  Foreign International 
Sales Corporation. This strategy would essentially move all DISCS  to post 
boxes in offshore locations that do not tax, following the lead of  the 
Belgians and French, whose export tax subsidies they justify on grounds 
that they occur offshore. Nontaxation of  foreign operations is accepted 
by GATT  practice. The risk of  the FISC is that it will be considered to be 
an artificial device, equivalent to a tax haven, designed to circumvent 
DISC’S violations of  GATT; major foreign countries would seem un- 
likely to judge such a vehicle as truly GATT-compatible. 
The best policy strategy would be to eliminate DISC entirely. To this 
end, it would be necessary to reshape political alliances by highlighting 
the small export effects of DISC and, more importantly, its adverse effect 
on output and employment in import-competing industries and on wages 
of  unskilled labor. As a complement to this strategy it would also be 
appropriate to enlarge the Export-Import Bank’s activity as long as the 
United States maintains a substantially overvalued exchange rate. 